A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0789-0zbMath1297.91095OpenAlexW1990163717MaRDI QIDQ404776

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, M. Carmen Marco-Gil

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182719

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value ⋮ Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

Cites Work

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• The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards.
• Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra's proposal
• The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
• Sustainability in bankruptcy problems.
• Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
• A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
• A quadratic programming model for product configuration optimization
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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