Optimal manipulation rules in a mixed oligopoly
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Publication:404967
DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0332-2zbMath1294.91109OpenAlexW1968507697MaRDI QIDQ404967
Marcella Scrimitore, Alessandra Chirco, Corrado Benassi
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0332-2
Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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