Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0364-2zbMath1294.91095OpenAlexW1965041271MaRDI QIDQ404990

Ross A. Tippit

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0364-2

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddeceptionfraudlending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting

This page was built for publication: Lender deception as a response to moral hazard