Voting in small committees

DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0321-5zbMath1294.91045OpenAlexW1598354067MaRDI QIDQ405000

Paolo Balduzzi, Annalisa Luporini, Clara Graziano

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0321-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingcommittees compositionsmall committees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

This page was built for publication: Voting in small committees