Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information

DOI10.1007/s00712-012-0325-1zbMath1294.91093OpenAlexW2090696112MaRDI QIDQ405002

Didier Laussel, Ana Pinto Borges, João Correia-da-Silva

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0325-1

zbMATH Keywords

regulationadverse selectionprocurementempire-buildingreservation utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building

Cites Work

• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Empire building by corporate managers
• Multidimensional screening.
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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