On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0360-6zbMath1294.91097OpenAlexW2052413087MaRDI QIDQ405006

J. Herrera, H. S. Yoon

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0360-6

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractscooperationrelationship-specific investments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Commitment vs. Flexibility

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