Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.004zbMath1296.91055OpenAlexW2147911310MaRDI QIDQ405529

George J. Mailath, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/10-032.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

separationadverse selectiondifferentiable strategiesincentive-compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Pervasive signaling ⋮ Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games ⋮ Unobservable costly effort in security design ⋮ Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games ⋮ Targeted Information Release in Social Networks

Cites Work

• Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
• Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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