Optimal policy with credibility concerns
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Publication:405540
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015zbMath1296.91203OpenAlexW1969912956MaRDI QIDQ405540
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015
Cites Work
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