Eliciting information from a committee

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008zbMath1296.91138OpenAlexW2005821969MaRDI QIDQ405544

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97357

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcollusionmultidimensional mechanism designaxiomatic bargainingclosed ruleexperts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages

Cites Work

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• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• OPTIMAL ARBITRATION
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Optimal Delegation
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Bargaining and Value

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