Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
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Publication:405546
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.014zbMath1296.91128OpenAlexW2129059872MaRDI QIDQ405546
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.014
interdependent valuesex-ante robustnessfirst-price menu auctionjoint ex-post renegotiation proofnessmonotone equilibria
Cites Work
- Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
- On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
- Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Efficient Auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
- Unnamed Item
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