Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013zbMath1296.91139OpenAlexW1994759319MaRDI QIDQ405548

Ruqu Wang, Jun Zhang

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbargaining powerresalemechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Equilibrium and welfare analysis in second-price auctions with resale and costly entry ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
• First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

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