Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.008zbMath1296.91122OpenAlexW3123916725MaRDI QIDQ405554

Juan Ortner, Avidit Acharya

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

delaybargainingmultiple issuesinefficiencypartial agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Collective hold‐up ⋮ Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license ⋮ A dynamic bargaining game with externalities

Cites Work

• The importance of the agenda in bargaining
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Bargaining in a long-term relationship with endogenous termination
• Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining. II: Unrestricted agendas
• Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Waiting to Persuade
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information

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