A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013zbMath1296.91208OpenAlexW2097598957MaRDI QIDQ405557

Ville Korpela

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

implementationsufficient conditionstrong equilibriummatching rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• On cores and indivisibility
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation