A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
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Publication:405557
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013zbMath1296.91208OpenAlexW2097598957MaRDI QIDQ405557
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013
Related Items (4)
Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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