Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0801-7zbMath1296.91103OpenAlexW1966294249MaRDI QIDQ405710

SangMok Lee

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0801-7

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingcollective choicejury trialplea bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort

Cites Work

• Social choice and strategic decisions. Essay in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks.
• Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information
• Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information
• Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers
• Deliberative voting
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

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