Speculative attacks with multiple targets
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Publication:405712
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0806-2zbMath1307.91199OpenAlexW1546465282MaRDI QIDQ405712
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_501.pdf
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)
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Cites Work
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