Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0803-5zbMath1307.91111OpenAlexW1977251274MaRDI QIDQ405717

Latchezar Popov

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0803-5

zbMATH Keywords

economic developmentcostly enforcementfirm dynamicslending contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (3)

Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default ⋮ On the sovereign debt paradox ⋮ Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions

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