Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
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Publication:405717
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0803-5zbMath1307.91111OpenAlexW1977251274MaRDI QIDQ405717
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0803-5
Related Items (3)
Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default ⋮ On the sovereign debt paradox ⋮ Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions
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