Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties

DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0234-8zbMath1294.91105OpenAlexW3125068381MaRDI QIDQ405762

Cheng-Zhong Qin, Martin Shubik

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d17/d1712.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumwelfare economicscredit mechanismmarginal utility of incomesaddle-point characterization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (2)

Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games ⋮ Offer curves and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium

Cites Work

• On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
• A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy
• Construction of Stationary Markov Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
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