The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.06.005zbMath1305.91189OpenAlexW2025692412MaRDI QIDQ406268

Francis X. Flanagan

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

latticestabilitymatching with contractsmany-to-one matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Structure theory of lattices (06B05) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• Vacancies in supply chain networks
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions

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