Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:406371
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.007zbMath1309.91069OpenAlexW2298976392MaRDI QIDQ406371
Youngsub Chun, René van den Brink, Yuan Ju
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=download&seqidx=34
Shapley valueimplementationqueueing problembidding mechanismmaximal transfer ruleminimal transfer rule
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Applying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery ⋮ Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ Comments on: ``Recent developments in the queueing problem
Cites Work
- Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems
- Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem
- No-envy in queueing problems
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
- Bargaining and Value
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
