Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.05.009zbMath1309.91097OpenAlexW2087667018MaRDI QIDQ406378

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcredit cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Credit risk (91G40)

Related Items (3)

Revisiting the model of credit cycles with good and bad projects ⋮ Volatile capital flows and financial integration: the role of moral hazard ⋮ Financial destabilization

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