Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
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Publication:406380
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.002zbMath1309.91071OpenAlexW2077440772MaRDI QIDQ406380
Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy, Anup Pramanik
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.002
Related Items (7)
Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
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