Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
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Publication:406393
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.007zbMath1309.91019OpenAlexW2065431165MaRDI QIDQ406393
Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite, Richard P. McLean
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.562.8486
Related Items (4)
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Folk theorem with communication
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