An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
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Publication:406416
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.014zbMath1309.91068OpenAlexW3121348236MaRDI QIDQ406416
Yuanchuan Lien, Jacob K. Goeree
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/99570/2/0B2gZChEx0Cn_ZjRWOTE5VURIdFE.pdf
Related Items (5)
On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction ⋮ Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions ⋮ Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
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