Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003zbMath1309.91073OpenAlexW1979914920MaRDI QIDQ406429

Ron Siegel

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscontestsasymmetriesall-paycorrelated signalsinterdependent valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (21)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting ⋮ A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information ⋮ On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types ⋮ Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security ⋮ All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study ⋮ Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals ⋮ A simple model of competition between teams ⋮ Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux ⋮ Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
• Contests with productive effort
• Optimal advertising of auctions
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Altruism and envy in contests: an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• All-Pay Contests

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