Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
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Publication:4074600
DOI10.2307/1911383zbMath0314.90005OpenAlexW1997653537MaRDI QIDQ4074600
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911383
Related Items (16)
Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ Aggregation of preferences: a review ⋮ Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules ⋮ Implementation by mediated equilibrium ⋮ Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules ⋮ Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability ⋮ Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions ⋮ A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions ⋮ Social Choice Theory
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