Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach

DOI10.1007/s11229-010-9770-yzbMath1235.03015OpenAlexW2081622834MaRDI QIDQ408339

Cedric Paternotte

Publication date: 5 April 2012

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9770-y

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgeDavid Lewisfallibilismprobabilistic belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items

Salience reasoning in coordination games, The fragility of common knowledge, Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals

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