Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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Publication:4090165
DOI10.2307/1914083zbMath0325.90081OpenAlexW2043715088WikidataQ55869235 ScholiaQ55869235MaRDI QIDQ4090165
Publication date: 1973
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a24b4e0b06cb0c26d44f0fc86fa0a1ecfc4d13b1
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