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An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition - MaRDI portal

An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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Publication:4102943

DOI10.1287/mnsc.20.11.1472zbMath0335.90063OpenAlexW4362236469WikidataQ115372033 ScholiaQ115372033MaRDI QIDQ4102943

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.20.11.1472




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