Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
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Publication:4110764
DOI10.2307/1912719zbMath0342.90001OpenAlexW2006683239MaRDI QIDQ4110764
Elisha A. Pazner, Ehud Kalai, David Schmeidler
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912719
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