Lumpy investment in regulated natural gas pipelines: an application of the theory of the second best
From MaRDI portal
Publication:411272
DOI10.1007/S11067-009-9125-8zbMath1235.91138OpenAlexW2145148269MaRDI QIDQ411272
Juan Rosellón, Dagobert L. Brito
Publication date: 4 April 2012
Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.357977.de/dp1024.pdf
Related Items (2)
A generalized Nash-Cournot model for the northwestern European natural gas markets with a fuel substitution demand function: the GaMMES model ⋮ Removing cross-border capacity bottlenecks in the European natural gas market -- a proposed merchant-regulatory mechanism
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Dynamic game theoretic model of multi-layer infrastructure networks
- Welfare effects of discriminatory two-part tariffs constrained by price caps
- Extended price cap mechanism for efficient transmission expansion under nodal pricing
- Relations among prices at adjacent nodes in an electric transmission network
This page was built for publication: Lumpy investment in regulated natural gas pipelines: an application of the theory of the second best