Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness

DOI10.2307/1911220zbMath0344.90051OpenAlexW2078300867MaRDI QIDQ4113619

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911220

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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