The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
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Publication:4120365
DOI10.2307/1913682zbMath0349.90153OpenAlexW2135009955MaRDI QIDQ4120365
Publication date: 1974
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee23c0ead85f7aeb63ee31489bf663549a7d3105
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