When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0610-1zbMath1266.91090OpenAlexW2111409929MaRDI QIDQ412076

William Leblanc, James M. jun. Snyder, Stephen Ansolabehere

Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0610-1

zbMATH Keywords

electionspolitical economypolitical parties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (5)

Endogenous party platforms: `stochastic' membership ⋮ Introduction to the symposium in political economy ⋮ A spatial theory of party formation ⋮ Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties ⋮ Ideological extremism and primaries

Cites Work

• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• Two-party competition with many constituencies
• A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions
• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Local Political Equilibria

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