The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
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Publication:412081
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0613-yzbMath1277.91153OpenAlexW2166606731MaRDI QIDQ412081
Matias Iaryczower, Andrea Mattozzi
Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79460/
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