Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4zbMath1277.91150OpenAlexW2168745364MaRDI QIDQ412085

Alexander V. Hirsch, David P. Baron

Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95190/

zbMATH Keywords

public policycommon agencylobbyinggridlockproto-coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (5)

Introduction to the symposium in political economy ⋮ A spatial theory of party formation ⋮ Lobbying and discretion ⋮ A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy ⋮ On the spatial representation of preference profiles

Cites Work

• The dynamics of distributive politics
• Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
• Lobbying and discretion
• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• The formateurs' role in government formation
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• A Structural Model of Government Formation

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