When do simple policies win?

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0620-ZzbMath1277.91155OpenAlexW2026918318MaRDI QIDQ412086

Ronny Razin, Gilat Levy

Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0620-z

zbMATH Keywords

complexitydebatesdynamic all-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Introduction to the symposium in political economy ⋮ The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game ⋮ The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

Cites Work

• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• Multi-battle contests
• Contest success functions
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.

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