A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
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Publication:412094
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0625-7zbMath1277.91149OpenAlexW2127702318WikidataQ110167441 ScholiaQ110167441MaRDI QIDQ412094
Pohan Fong, David P. Baron, Daniel Diermeier
Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31174
inefficiencyproportional representationgovernment formationlack of commitmentparliamentary democracypolicy dynamics
Related Items (12)
Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis ⋮ Two-party competition with persistent policies ⋮ When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems ⋮ The dynamics of distributive politics ⋮ The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections ⋮ Introduction to the symposium in political economy ⋮ Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy ⋮ A spatial theory of party formation ⋮ On the spatial representation of preference profiles ⋮ Ideology and endogenous constitutions ⋮ A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection ⋮ Corruption and power in democracies
Cites Work
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- On participation games with complete information
- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
- Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
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