A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores

DOI10.1137/0132026zbMath0354.90099OpenAlexW2013043302MaRDI QIDQ4126098

Lilian Shiao-Yen Wu

Publication date: 1977

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0132026

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (11)

The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks ⋮ Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ On the \(k\)-accessibility of cores of \textit{TU}-cooperative games ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions ⋮ The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension ⋮ The coalition structure core is accessible ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ Enlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions ⋮ U-CYCLES IN n-PERSON TU-GAMES WITH ONLY 1, n - 1 AND n-PERSON PERMISSIBLE COALITIONS ⋮ Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study

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