Regulating collateral-requirements when markets are incomplete
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.09.004zbMath1258.91131OpenAlexW2057531951MaRDI QIDQ413485
Felix Kubler, Susan Schommer, Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo
Publication date: 7 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/38755/1/Regulating_Collateral_when_markets_are_incomplete.pdf
collateraldefaultregulationgeneral equilibriumincomplete marketsPareto efficiencywelfarerisk sharinggovernment interventionidentical homothetic utility
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (13)
Cites Work
- Pareto improving financial innovation in incomplete markets
- Endogenous collateral
- Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment
- Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral
- Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets
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