Social Decision Functions and the Veto
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Publication:4136859
DOI10.2307/1912677zbMath0362.90002OpenAlexW1973002628MaRDI QIDQ4136859
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912677
Partial orders, general (06A06) Decision theory (91B06) Trade models (91B60) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
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