Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
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Publication:4139910
DOI10.2307/2296596zbMath0364.90005OpenAlexW2082073996MaRDI QIDQ4139910
Publication date: 1976
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296596
Related Items (10)
Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Stable voting schemes ⋮ Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs ⋮ Implementation by mediated equilibrium ⋮ Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation ⋮ Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules ⋮ Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability ⋮ A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
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