Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments

DOI10.1137/0129006zbMath0364.90126OpenAlexW2066533901MaRDI QIDQ4140022

Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 1975

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0129006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (18)

Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ Correspondence between social choice functions and solutions of cooperative games ⋮ A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties ⋮ Reinterpreting the kernel ⋮ Differential games with nonzero sum (cooperative variant) ⋮ Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments ⋮ Noncooperative differential games ⋮ Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION ⋮ The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games ⋮ On computational methods for solutions of multiobjective linear production programming games ⋮ A note on a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments ⋮ A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus ⋮ When do market games have transferable utility?

This page was built for publication: Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments