Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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Publication:4140621
DOI10.2307/1911681zbMath0365.90006OpenAlexW3124207685MaRDI QIDQ4140621
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/175.pdf
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