Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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Publication:4142947
DOI10.2307/1911219zbMath0366.90021OpenAlexW2135954328MaRDI QIDQ4142947
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/14919/1/Laffont_14919.pdf
Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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