Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001zbMath1237.91109OpenAlexW3125823961MaRDI QIDQ414371

M. Bumin Yenmez

Publication date: 11 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

multi-object auctionsefficient mechanismsmultidimensional types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (3)

Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching

Cites Work

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• Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
• A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

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