An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson- Samuelson Welfare Function

DOI10.2307/2297221zbMath0368.90003OpenAlexW2057720222MaRDI QIDQ4145042

Robert P. Parks

Publication date: 1976

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297221

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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Beyond pareto optimality: The necessity of interpersonal cardinal utilities in distributional judgements and social choice ⋮ Two simple single-profile impossibilities ⋮ On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions ⋮ Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules ⋮ Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions ⋮ Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity ⋮ Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution ⋮ The generation of a social welfare function under ordinal preferences ⋮ On the existence of an Arrow and a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function ⋮ The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated ⋮ An interview with Paul Samuelson: Welfare economics, ``old and ``new, and social choice theory ⋮ Why ethical measures of inequality need interpersonal comparisons ⋮ Paul A. Samuelson ⋮ Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem

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