Power and Taxes

DOI10.2307/1914063zbMath0367.90016OpenAlexW1971509156WikidataQ96377851 ScholiaQ96377851MaRDI QIDQ4145348

Mordecai Kurz, Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914063

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

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