Condorcet Social Choice Functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4146476
DOI10.1137/0133030zbMath0369.90002OpenAlexW1968498770WikidataQ56169496 ScholiaQ56169496MaRDI QIDQ4146476
Publication date: 1977
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0133030
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Possible winner problems on partial tournaments: a parameterized study ⋮ An influence analysis of the number of members on the quality of knowledge in a collective ⋮ A CONSIDERATION OF DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF FUZZY COVERING RELATIONS ⋮ Isomorphic Distances Among Elections ⋮ Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules ⋮ Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox ⋮ Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions ⋮ Combinatorics of Election Scores ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments ⋮ Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff ⋮ Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting ⋮ The traveling group problem ⋮ Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? ⋮ A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments ⋮ Defining the Borda count in a linguistic decision making context ⋮ Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule ⋮ On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule ⋮ Deriving consensus in multiagent systems ⋮ Rational stability of choice functions ⋮ Two‐stage majoritarian choice ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Tight bounds on 3-team manipulations in randomized death match ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules ⋮ In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games ⋮ Robustness against inefficient manipulation ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules ⋮ The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement ⋮ Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities ⋮ How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections? ⋮ Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ The Borda rule and Pareto stability: A further comment ⋮ Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations ⋮ Borda and condorcet: Some distance results ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets ⋮ Computational Aspects of Approval Voting ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule ⋮ Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes ⋮ ON GROUP DECISION MAKING UNDER LINGUISTIC ASSESSMENTS ⋮ A multivariate solution of the multivariate ranking and selection problem ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions ⋮ A characterization of the generalized optimal choice set through the optimization of generalized weak utilities ⋮ On a compromise social choice correspondence ⋮ Generalized medians and a political center ⋮ On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence ⋮ Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives ⋮ Metric rationalisation of social choice functions according to principles of social choice ⋮ Choosing from a tournament ⋮ An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences ⋮ The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison ⋮ The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions ⋮ Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover ⋮ Consensus-based partitions in the space of ordered partitions ⋮ A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure ⋮ Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence ⋮ Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules ⋮ Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules ⋮ Majority-approval social choice ⋮ Induced social welfare functions ⋮ On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results ⋮ Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods ⋮ Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison ⋮ The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets ⋮ Three practical criteria of comparison among ordinal preference aggregating rules ⋮ Weighted representative democracy ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules ⋮ Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? ⋮ A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method ⋮ A topological characterization of the existence of non-empty choice sets ⋮ Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice ⋮ The informational basis of scoring rules ⋮ Minimal stable sets in tournaments ⋮ Internal slackening scoring methods ⋮ Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability ⋮ On the construction of non-empty choice sets ⋮ The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet ⋮ Combinatorial \(n\)-fold integer programming and applications ⋮ Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution ⋮ Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections ⋮ Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation ⋮ On two new social choice correspondences.
This page was built for publication: Condorcet Social Choice Functions
