Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
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Publication:4147899
DOI10.2307/1914235zbMath0371.90128OpenAlexW2079761526MaRDI QIDQ4147899
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/203.pdf
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