Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice

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Publication:4153859

DOI10.2307/2297061zbMath0376.90008OpenAlexW2005467652MaRDI QIDQ4153859

Louis Gevers, Claude d'Aspremont

Publication date: 1977

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4d185bf4cb9375e768dd893a98f902a27fd6cc64




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